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MISCEGENATION: THE COURTS AND
THE CONSTITUTION
Miscegenation is generally defined as the interbreeding or marriage
of persons of different races, but the term will here be used in refer-
ence to miscegenetic marriages only. That is, this paper will concern
itself only with the aspects of the marriage laws of various states that
relate to miscegenation. The purpose of this paper will be to show the
antecedents of miscegenation in the American legal system, the meth-
ods of constitutional justification of miscegenation statutes in state
courts, and the change in regard to their validity given by the federal
judiciary.
BACKGROUND
Prohibitions against miscegenation date back to the earliest colonial
times, and the first record of sanctions imposed for this act in the
Virginia colony appears in Hening's extract from the judicial proceed-
ings of the Governor and Council of Virginia:
September 17th, 1630. Hugh Davis to be soundly whipped, before
an assembly of negroes and others for abusing himself to the dishonor
of God and shame of Christians, by defiling his body in lying with a
negro; which fault he is to acknowledge next Sabbath day.'
That prohibitions against miscegenation have been widespread in
the United States can be seen in the fact that they have appeared in
the statutes of some forty states. Of these forty, twenty-three have
repealed their statutes,2 half of these having been repealed within the
last two decades as a result of the movement for Negro equality as
well as the publicity occasioned by a 1948 decision of the California
Supreme Court which struck down that state's miscegenation statute.3
1. 1 Laws of Virginia 146 (Hening 1823). Other representative miscegenation laws
of the American colonies: Maryland, 1692- Acts of Md. 76 (Bisset 1759); North Caro-
lina, 1741- 1 Public Acts 1715-90, at 45-46 (Martin's Revisal of Iredell 1804); South
Carolina, 1717- 3 Star. at Large of S.C., No. 383, at 20 (Cooper 1838).
2. These states and the date when the statute was repealed are: Arizona (1962),
California (judically) (1948), Colorado (1957), Idaho (1959), Indiana (1965), Iowa
(1851), Kansas (1857), Maine (1883), Massachusetts (1840), Michigan (1883), Montana
(1953), Nebraska (1963), Nevada (1959), New Mexico (1886), North Dakota (1955),
Ohio (1887), Oregon (1959), Pennsylvania (1891), Rhode Island (1881), South Dakota
(1957), Utah (1963), Washington (1867), Wyoming (1965).
3. Perez v. Sharp, sub. nom. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948).
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Nontheless, it is indeed surprising that seventeen states still retain their
miscegenation statutes.4 Of these seventeen states, six make express
provisions in their constitutions either forbidding the passage of laws
validating such marriages or else maling them void ab initio.5
Miscegenation is an entirely statutory crime, generally considered to
be of the grade of a felony, the penalty for which ranges up to im-
prisonment for ten years and fines up to $2,000.
All miscegenation statutes contain general provisions against the
intermarriage of Negroes and Caucasians, but others have expanded
their scope to include Malays,' American Indians,7 Mestizos," and
Half-breeds.' Although these statutes in the main do not prohibit in-
termarriage between members of races other than white, all prohibit
intermarriage between a white person and a member of the designated
non-white group or groups.
And just as the groups with which intermarriage is prohibited vary
from state to state, so also does the definition of "Negro." One state
classifies a Negro as any person of one-eighth or more Negro blood,'
while others define Negroes as any person of Negro descent to the third
generation inclusive."' Two states include every person in whom there
is any ascertainable Negro blood within the prohibited group.12
That these statutes are an anomaly in this period of constitutional and
social reform is readily apparent. Nevertheless, their antecedents run
deep in the American legal system.
4. A". CODE tit. 14, § 360 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-104,-105 (1947); DEi.. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 101,-102 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. H9 741-11-.12 (1961); GA. CODE
§§ 53-106, -214, -312, -9903 (1933); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 402.020, .040, .990 (1962); LA. REv.
STAT. §§ 9.201, .221, 14.79 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 398 (1957); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 459, 2002, 2234 (1956); Mo. REv. STAT. § 451.020 (Supp. 1963), § 563.240 (1959);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-181 (1950); OKcLA. STAT. tit. 43, §§ 12, 13 (1961); S.C. CoDE ANN.
S§ 20-7, -8 (1962); TEN. CoDE ANN. §§ 36-402,-403 (1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4607
(Supp. 1960), Trx. PN. CODE arts. 492-93 (Supp. 1960); VA. CODE ANN. 9 20-58,-59
(1960); W.VA. CODE ANN. S§ 4695, 4697 (1961).
5. ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 102; FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 24; Miss. CONET. art. 14, § 263; N.C.
CoNsT. art. 14, § 8; S.C. CosT. art. 3, § 33; TENN. CoNsT. art. 11, § 14.
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 398 (1957).








MISCEGENATION AND THE STATES
The highest courts in some fourteen states have passed upon the
question of constitutionality of miscegenation statutes and have uni-
formly upheld their validity under both state and federal constitutions. "'
The avenues upon which these statutes have been attacked range from
violation of various state constitutional provisions to the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.-' However, the most frequent points upon which the
stamtu have been challenged are the impairment of contracts," priv-
ileges and immunities, 17 due process,'8 and equal protection 9 clauses
of the United States Constitution.
The state courts seem to have vindicated their miscegenation statutes
on three bases: (1). contract, (2). equal application of a reasonable
regulation, and (3). exclusive state institutionality.
The contractual viewpoint seems to be the oldest in point of time
and the simplest in its outlook. That is, the courts approached the
problem by concluding that these statutes had nothing to do with reg-
ulating the social status of the citizen and stood upon the same footing
as laws controlling other contracts, but to hold that "(m)arriage is a
13. See Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869); State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 232 (1869);
State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871); Lonas v. State, 3 Heiskell (50 Tenn.) 287 (1871);
Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); State v.
Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895); In re
Paquet's Estate, 101 Ore. 393, 200 P. 911 (1921); Kirby v. Kirby, 24 Ariz. 9, 206 P. 405
(1922); Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 296, 231 P. 483 (1924); In re Atkins, 151 Okla. 294,
3 P. 2d 682 (1931); State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P. 2d 882 (1942); In re Shun T.
Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P. 2d 217 (1942); Jackson v. Denver, 109 Colo.
196, 124 P. 2d 240 (1942); Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140 (1948); Jackson
v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So. 2d 114, 260 Ala. App. 698, 72 So. 2d 116, cert. den., 348
U.S. 888 (1954); Rogers v. State, 37 Ala. App. 638, 73 So. 2d 389 (1954); Naim v. Naim,
197 Va. 80, 87 S.E. 2d 749, remanded, 350 U.S. 891, aff'd., 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E. 2d 849,
appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1955); State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So. 2d 233 (1959);
Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E. 2d 78 (1966).
14. See, e.g., Scott v. Georgia, supra note 13.
15. Civil Rights Bill of April 9, 1966, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
See Lonas v. State, supra note 13; Green v. State, supra note 13; Dodson v. State, supra
note 13.
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10. See State v. Gibson, supra note 13; Lonas v. State,
supra note 13.
17. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1. See Lonas v. State, supra note 13; State v. Jackson,
supra note 13; Dodson v. State, supra note 13.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 1 1. See Jackson v. Denver, supra note 13; Naim v.
Naim, supra note 13.
19. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. See State v. Gibson, subra note 13; see generally
State v. Brown, supra note 13; Naim v. Naim, supra note 13; Loving v. Commonwealth,
supra note 13.
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civil contract, regulated by law . ..," 20 left the states open to appeal
to the federal courts on the ground of impairment of contract, and thus
this avenue of approach was soon discarded.
Another rather simplistic attempt to resolve the problem was for the
court to assume arguendo that prohibition of miscegenetic marriages was
a reasonable regulation and then to justify the statute on the ground
that it applied equally to both races.2 ' This arguendo approach to the
problem saved several courts from the tenacious ground of Brandeisian
jurisprudence as illustrated by the following judicial observation:
It is stated as a well authenticated fact that if the issue of a black
man and a white woman, and a white man and a black woman, inter-
marry, they cannot possibly have any progeny .... 22
The argument most frequently applied in the defense of miscegena-
tion was that marriage is a civil status23 and as such is subject to the
exclusive power of state regulation. 24 The most cogent statement of
this viewpoint is found in the following from State v. Gibson:
The right in the states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect,
and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christianizing institutibn
is of inestimable importance and cannot be surrendered .... 25
This argument approached its penultimate in Nain v. Nain, in which
the court held that state regulation of the marriage relation was "safe-
guarded by that bastion of State's rights, somewhat battered perhaps
but still a sturdy fortress in our fundamental law, the tenth section
of the Bill of Rights." 26 To hold that marriage is such that it can be
defined as a power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment2 7
is a very logical capstone to this particular line of reasoning. Yet it is
an extremely weak argument as will be illustrated subsequently.
20. State v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, 328 (1869); accord, State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 232
(1869).
21. See Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895); Jackson v. Denver, 109 Colo.
196, 124 P. 2d 240 (1942); State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So. 2d 233 (1959).
22. State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 177 (1883).
23. See Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
24. See Lonas v. State, 3 Heiskell (50 Tenn.) 287 (1871); Loving v. Commonwealth,
147 S.E. 2d 78 (1966); accord, Kirby v. Kirby, 24 Ariz. 9, 206 P. 405 (1922); In re Shun
T. Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P. 2d 217 (1942).
25. 36 Ind. 389, 402 (1871).
26. 197 Va. 80, 90,87 S.E. 2d 749, 756 (1955).
27. US. CoNsr. amend. X.
MISCEGENATION
.It appears, then, that the state judiciary laid the constitutional foun-
dations of miscegenation in accord with a general feeling that racial
intermarriage was a socially undesirable practice, the prohibition of
which could be accomplished by statute. The fact that this was not
a universal solution is indicated in two state cases holding such statutes
invalid. The first of these came, surprisingly enough, from Alabama.
There the court found that the Alabama statute was in contravention
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment in that these laws ".... intended to destroy the distinctions
of race and color in respect to the rights secured by (them). (They)
did not aim merely to create an equality of the races in reference to
each other." 28 The authority of the case is questionable, however, as
it was later overruled.2 9
A conclusive result was achieved in Perez v. Sharp,30 wherein the
California Supreme Court invalidated that state's miscegenation statute
by a 4-3 decision. The case arose from a mandamus proceeding in
which the appellants had sought to compel the clerk of Los Angeles
county to issue them a marriage certificate. In its decision the court at
first intimated that the statutes proscribing miscegenetic marriages
might have been a restraint on the guarantee of freedom of religion
as embodied in the First Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, 31 but the ratio decidenti of the majority was that "(m)arriage is
thus something more than a civil contract subject to regulation by
the state; it is a fundamental right of free men. There can be no pro-
hibition of marriage except for an important social objective and by
reasonable means.32 Thus having placed the marital right within the
"penumbra" of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court then concluded
that it violated the equal protection of the laws clause. 3 Perez is thus
the only state decision remaining that has challenged the validity of
miscegenation, and it received little attention when first decided.
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Until recently the miscegenation statutes received about the same
treatment in the federal courts as they did in the states. The reasoning
28. Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 197 (1872).
29. Green v. State, supra note 23.
30. Sub. nom. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. 198 P. 2d at 18.
33. Id., at 29.
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advanced in the earlier federal decisions proceeded on the accepted
ground that "(t)he subject of marriage is one exclusively under the
control of each state. Each one may pass such laws as it deems proper
regulating the institution." " Nor did these earlier federal decisions
make any attempt to apply the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the questioned statutes:
The Fourteenth Amendment gives no power to Congress to inter-
fere with the right of a state to regulate the domestic relations of its
own citizens, and if a state enact such laws..., the federal courts must
respect them as they stand, without inquiring into the reasons of
them.35
The Supreme Court of the United States has passed directly upon
the constitutionality of miscegenation laws upon only two occasions.
Its earlier decision, Pace v. Alabama,36 arose on writ of error from the
Supreme Court of Alabama, the appellants contesting their conviction
under that state's miscegenetic fornication statute on the ground that it
was in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The particular statute in question provided a more severe
penalty for interracial fornication, but the Court held this to be a sep-
arate offense, and "(w)hatever discrimination is made in the punish-
ment prescribed . . . is directed against the offense designated and not
against the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of
each offending person, whether white or black, is the same." 37 That
the Court now considers this to be an extremely narrow view of the
equal protection clause will be shown hereafter.
The topic seemed to be well settled even after the decision in Browmn
v. Board of Education,8 as the Supreme Court denied certiorari in one
case" and later refused to hear an appeal from an order of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia ignoring the Court's order remanding
34. Ex parte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 699, 700 (No. 5,047) (C.C.V.D. Tex. 1879); accord,
In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262 (No. 6,550) (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871); State v. Tutty, 41 Fed.
753 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890).
35. Ex parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602, 605 (No. 7,825) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879); accord,
Stevens v. U.S., 146 F. 2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944).
36. 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
37. Id., at 585.
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So. 2d 114, 260 Ala. App. 698, 72 So. 2d
116, cert. den., 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
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a case to the trial courts so as to make a more complete record on
appeal.4
Nonetheless, the proposition first given judicial recognition in Perez,
that prohibition of racial cohabitation cannot be accomplished by
statute, gained acceptance in 1964, when the Supreme Court delivered
a decision that signaled the end of its tacit acceptance of the tenets
of miscegenation. In McLaughlin v. Florida41 the Court had before it
a Florida criminal statute prohibiting an interracial couple from habit-
ually living in and occupying the same room in the nighttime. The
factual situation was thus essentially the same as presented in Pace, but
here the Court held the statute invalid under the equal protection clause.
Concerning its decision in Pace, the Court pointed out that that case:
represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause -which has
not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court. Ju-
dicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause . . . does not end
with a showing of equal application among the members of the class
defined by the legislation. The courts must reach and determine the
question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable
(emphasis added) in light of its purpose .... 42
The Court did not consider, however, the constitutionality of the
state's prohibition of miscegenetic marriages; 43 but it is submitted that
once a proper vehicle is found, it will not hesitate in applying the test
set forth in McLaughlin, and a recent decision of the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, Loving v. CommonWealth, 44 seems to have all the
prerequisites.
Loving AND BEYOND
The Loving case would involve one single point on appeal-the va-
lidity of a conviction for the statutory crime of contracting a misce-
genetic marriage. The case came before the Virginia court on a motion
40. Nairn v. Naim, 197 Va. 80,87 S.E. 2d 749, remanded, 350 US. 891, aff'd, 197 Va.
734, 90 S.E. 2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1955). The Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals ignored similar mandates in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 353;
William v. Buffrey, 102 U.S. 248 (1880). -
41. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
42. Id., at 188, 191. This test has been cited with approval by the Court in two later
cases involving voting rights; Carrington v. Rash, 380 US. 89, 93 (1965); Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 (1966).
43. Id., at 196.
44.- 147 S.E. 2d 78 (1966).
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to vacate the judgment and set aside sentence. The Virginia Attorney
General's office relied heavily, in its argument, on the brief filed in
behalf of the state of Florida in McLaughlin,45 the gravamen of that
brief being that in the light of its legislative history the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not intend it to extend to the miscegena-
tion laws. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in McLaughlin,46
and the Virginia court made no mention of it, but rather relied on its
holding in Naim, stating that a decision reversing that case ".... would
be judicial legislation in the rawest sense of that term." 47 The question
that thus presents itself is, if the Supreme Court were to hear the appeal,
would it apply the McLaughlin precedent?
To hold that marriage is a "right" within the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is a rather shaky supposition. While
there is good authority that marriage is just such a right,4" there is
equally good authority to the contrary.49 And by the same token, to
hold as the state courts have done in Naim that the right to regulate
marriage is exclusively vested in the states by virtue of a Tenth Amend-
ment argument is also questionable.50
The most promising ground of attack seems to be the equal protec-
tion clause. Remembering for the moment that the Court of Mc-
Laughlin held that a valid classification under the equal protection
clause must be reasonable, it is clear that legislative classification or dis-
crimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of
equal protection.51 This is a result of the fact that although normally
the legislature is given wide discretion in making statutory classifica-
45. Brief for Commonwealth, p. 28 (Record No. 6163).
46. McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 41, at 195. See generally Pittman, The Four-
teentb Amendment: Its Intended Effect on Anti-miscegenation Laws, 43 N.C.L. REv.
92 (1964). The Court has consistently ignored this type of approach: ". . . the Equal
Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era." Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, supra note 42 at 1083.
47. Loving v. Commonwealth, supra note 44, at 82.
48. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1922); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 536 (1941); Griswold v. Connecticut, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1692 (1965).
49. E.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1887).
50. The amendment was nothing "more than declaratory of the relationship between
the national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution."
U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.. 100, 124 (1941); accord, U.S. v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
51. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (licensing of laundries); Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (use and occupation of property); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,
271 U.S. 500 (1925) (keeping of account books); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1941)
(grand jury lists); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (alienation of land);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (commercial fishing licenses);
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tions, 52 the Court seems to have shifted this presumption where such
classifications are based on race alone, thus casting the burden upon the
state to prove a reasonable basis.
Classifications based solely on race must be scrutinized with par-
ticular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence
constitutionally suspect.ta
This being the case, the grounds advanced to prove that racial clas-
sifications are reasonable in regard to miscegenetic marriages have been
three: sociological, scientific, alleviation of racial tension.
Since this discussion is limited to a constitutional analysis of misce-
crenation, it would be inappropriate to include here a lengthy discussion
of the scientific and sociological arguments in regard to miscegenation.
It is sufficient to say that the general consensus is that racial distinctions
have no place in today's society.54
In regard to the ground of alleviation of racial tension, the Court
has said that "(d)esirable as this is, and as is the preservation of the
public peace. this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances
which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution." "
And again when presented with a breach of the peace conviction for
playing basketball in a segregated park, "... . the possibility of disorder
by others cannot justify exclusion of persons from a place if they
otherwise have a constitutional right (founded upon the Equal Pro-
tection Clause) to be present." 56
Thus it appears that the solution adopted by the states and the earlier
federal courts to the problem of interracial marriage, that is, that its
prohibition could be accomplished by statute, will be disregarded by
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (nomination papers and ballots); Watson v.
City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (public parks and playgrounds); Hamm v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1969), aff'd. per curarn,
379 U.S. 19 (1964) (voting and property records).
52. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1910); Allied Stores
of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1958); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1960).
53. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); accord, Hirabayashi v. US, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (dictum); Korematsu v. U.S, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (dictum);
Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156 (1964); Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218,
231 (1964).
54. See generally Science and the Race Problem, 142 SCIENCE 558 (1963); MONTAGUE,
MAN's Mosr DANGEROUS MyTH: THE FALLACY or RACE (4th ed. 1964); MyaIm, AN
AmErcAxc DiL. ,mA (1944).
55. Buchananv. Warley, supra note 51, at 81.
56. Wright v. Georgia, 373 US. 284, 293 (1963).
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the Court as it did in McLaughlin. No matter how deep their ante-
cedents, the Court could well find that miscegenetic marriage laws
violate the mandates of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Cyrus E. Phillips IV
